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Abstract Neurophysiological studies have shown that
parietal mirror neurons encode not only actions but also the
goal of these actions. Although some mirror neurons will
fire whenever a certain action is perceived (goal-indepen-
dently), most will only fire if the motion is perceived as part
of an action with a specific goal. This result is important
for the action-understanding hypothesis as it provides a
potential neurological basis for such a cognitive ability. It is
also relevant for the design of artificial cognitive systems,
in particular robotic systems that rely on computational
models of the mirror system in their interaction with other
agents. Yet, to date, no computational model has explicitly
addressed the mechanisms that give rise to both goal-spe-
cific and goal-independent parietal mirror neurons. In the
present paper, we present a computational model based on a
self-organizing map, which receives artificial inputs repre-
senting information about both the observed or executed
actions and the context in which they were executed. We
show that the map develops a biologically plausible orga-
nization in which goal-specific mirror neurons emerge. We
further show that the fundamental cause for both the
appearance and the number of goal-specific neurons can be
found in geometric relationships between the different
inputs to the map. The results are important to the action-
understanding hypothesis as they provide a mechanism for
the emergence of goal-specific parietal mirror neurons and
lead to a number of predictions: (1) Learning of new goals
may mostly reassign existing goal-specific neurons rather
than recruit new ones; (2) input differences between
executed and observed actions can explain observed
corresponding differences in the number of goal-specific
neurons; and (3) the percentage of goal-specific neurons
may differ between motion primitives.
Keywords Mirror neurons  Action-understanding
hypothesis  Computational model  Neural activation
patterns  Self-organizing map
Introduction
Functional Roles of Mirror Neurons
Since the mid-90s, mirror neurons have received a con-
siderable and increasing amount of attention. Indeed, the
possibility that neurons that are active both when agents
observe a goal-directed action and when they execute the
same action [1] has lead to the hypothesis that they may be
the crucial link between perceiving and understanding
actions. Such a mechanism is attractive to many fields:
neurophysiologists, for instance, may be chiefly interested
in understanding the precise functioning of the underlying
neural mechanisms, while cognitive scientists are provided
with a possible pathway for social understanding and
interactions. The interest in mirror neurons also extends to
the fields of artificial intelligence and robotics [2–4], where
mechanisms that allow understanding and even learning
the intentions or actions of others (for instance, through
imitation) are a very active research topic.
Consequently, the literature is now swamped with
papers on mirror neurons. A recent review paper [5] lists no
less than 125 references even though it focuses only on one
aspect of mirror neuron research (their functional role).
Nevertheless, the debate over what cognitive functions
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mirror neurons actually underlie is still going strong. The
most important claim is the aforementioned linkage
between action perception and action-understanding [5–9]
but even that does not go without criticism. For example, it
has been pointed out that there is not actually any con-
clusive evidence that mirror neurons are necessary for
action understanding [10].
In terms of neurophysiological data to support the
action-understanding hypothesis, a large proportion of
recorded parietal mirror neurons in macaque monkeys, all
shown to encode grasping, only fire if the goal of the
overall observed action is either to eat the grasped object or
to place it in a container [6]. Moreover, only a small pro-
portion of neurons fire in both goal scenarios, whereas the
remaining neurons appear to be selective. There is evi-
dence that a similar mechanism may be at play in the
human brain [7]. Another study presented an experiment in
which monkeys grasped objects with pliers [8]. These
pliers were either ‘‘normal,’’ requiring a closing of the hand
to close them or ‘‘inverted,’’ requiring an opening of the
hand to close them. Mirror neurons in area F5 were found
to respond in a similar fashion to grasping irrespective of
the type of pliers used, indicating that the neurons were
encoding the ‘‘grasping’’ concept rather than the underly-
ing motor commands.
Action understanding aside, mirror neurons are also
thought to play a role in learning by imitation [11] as well
as in the sensorimotor grounding of language (see [12] for
a discussion). A more radical argument that mirror neurons
are essential for the evolution of language is made largely
by philosophical reasoning [13], supported by the hypoth-
esis that Broca’s area, involved in human language, may
have evolved from area F5 in monkeys [14]. Again, these
hypotheses do not go without criticism; it is for instance
repeatedly pointed out that macaque monkeys, from which
most of the currently existing neurophysiological data have
been obtained, neither use language nor imitate [11].
Mirror mechanisms are also thought to be a key to
understanding the close relationship between perception,
action and social cognition [15]. Further, there are indica-
tions that mirror mechanisms are also involved in under-
standing the emotions of others. For example, it was found
that observing facial expressions of disgust activated sim-
ilar brain areas (anterior insula and to some extent anterior
cingulate cortex) as when being exposed to different dis-
gusting odors [16]. Mirror mechanisms can also extend to
the sensation of, for instance, touch or pain [17, 18].
Hence, it is clear that the hypothesized functions of
mirror neurons are all fundamental to the interaction
between agents. It thus comes as no surprise that mirror
neurons are also of high interest to the field of robotics [19,
20], in particular humanoid robotics, as they may hold the
key to solving current challenges in designing robots that
can interact robustly with humans and use, for instance
imitation learning to survive in unknown environments.
Robots may even be able to learn rudimentary forms of
language based on computational mirror system models
[21].
Mirror Neuron Models
In a recent review of computational mirror neuron models
[11], a taxonomy based on the methodology underlying
such models has been proposed, identifying four main
categories: ‘‘data driven,’’ ‘‘reason for existence,’’ ‘‘assume
existence’’ and ‘‘evolutionary algorithm,’’ which are in
some cases further subdivided. The main motivation
underlying this division is that different methodologies can
investigate different aspects of mirror systems. For instance,
models in the ‘‘reason for existence’’ and ‘‘assume exis-
tence’’ categories try to, one way or another, determine the
functions of the mirror system and replicate this in artificial
agents to endow them with the same capability. Imitation is
the chief example of such a functionality [3, 22, 23], but
language understanding in robots [21] is another.
Data-driven models on the other hand attempt to collect
available information on mirror neurons into a general
model in order to produce new predictions. The chief
examples in this category are the MNS [24] and MNS2 [25]
models. For instance, although originally focusing more on
the anatomy of the mirror system (and thus primarily based
on monkey data), the MNS2 model has recently [26] been
used to model behavior observed in a cat, hypothesizing that
mirror neurons may be able to ‘‘reflect’’ on an agent’s own
actions and allow rapid reorganization of motor programs.
Based on the model, it is possible to propose several
mechanisms that may be underlying observed behaviors
even in humans, but it remains to be verified to what degree
these are actually biologically plausible. At the same time,
as briefly discussed before, uncertainty about biological
plausibility does not prevent the use of the proposed
mechanisms in robots.
It is particularly interesting to note that when the review
[11] was published, models driven specifically by physio-
logical data were still missing from the scene. This is
beginning to change; Chain models [4, 27, 28] for instance
build upon the previously mentioned neurophysiological
findings [6]. They have been used, for instance, to model
the development of intention understanding [4, 27] and to
explain conflicting data regarding facilitation and inter-
ference effects during sentence processing [12].
Developmental Models of Mirror Neurons
Relatively few models address the actual development of
the mirror system (but see, for instance, [4, 30] and to some
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extent [25]). However, from a robotics as well as an
embodied cognition perspective, this is a highly interesting
issue. In robotics, a developmental account removes, or at
least significantly reduces, the need for a hard-coded sys-
tem, opening instead the way for online, adaptive and
human-interactive implementations. Further, such an
account can increase our understanding of how the body, in
particular bodily differences (for example, between
humans and humanoid robots or between adults and chil-
dren) and bodily experience (both individual and social),
might shape the mirror system. Although Erlhagen et al.
[4] address this in part by providing an online mechanism
for learning chains of motion primitives, the use of a
Hebbian learning approach may ultimately be limiting.
Our previous developmental model [29] uses self-orga-
nizing maps to illustrate that those can organize into
region, or ‘‘pools’’ of nodes encoding specific motion
primitives, in a way that is hypothesized by the chain
models [28] based on the work of Fogassi et al. [6].
Although this model is able to learn new inputs during
runtime, it does not take into account the goal-specific
aspects of the neurophysiological data [6], nor does it
model the formation of chains previously addressed by, for
instance, [4].
Finally, a bio-robotic approach illustrating that mirror-
like representations, as observed in brain area F5, can
develop simply from the interaction of an agent with its
environment has been presented by Metta et al. [30].
Although the overall structure is similar and largely in
agreement with the MNS model, particular efforts were
made to use unsupervised learning algorithms and to
realize a partial robotic implementation.
Modeling the Development of Goal-Specificity
in Mirror Neurons
The main purpose of the model presented in this paper is to
provide an explanation of how a mirror system may
develop goal-specific neurons as described by [6], an
interesting feature of mirror neurons that has so far not
received much attention by computational modelers. Spe-
cifically, we investigate (1) whether such an organization
can develop without assumptions on the functional role of
mirror neurons and (2) which aspects of the inputs to the
mirror system may influence the development of such goal-
specific neurons. We build upon our previous work [29] to
detail how a ‘‘blank’’ structure (representing parietal mirror
neurons that have seen some previous attention by mod-
elers [28, 29]) can develop a representation of its inputs in
line with the finding that most but not all neurons encoding
a given motion primitive are also sensitive to the goal of
the overall action [6]. We show that these findings can be
reproduced without making any assumptions regarding
functional roles of mirror neurons. We are further able to
detail the mechanism underlying the emergence of goal-
specific neurons and determine which aspects of the model
input control their number. This has two important impli-
cations. First, it provides computational modelers and those
interested in biologically inspired robotics with a simple,
controllable way of reproducing and implementing the
firing patterns observed in biology, so that they may be
used in the implementation/development of an artificial
agent’s behavioral and cognitive capacities. Second, it
provides a testable hypothesis that similar mechanisms
might be at work in biological mirror systems, which in
turn may increase our understanding of the evolution of the
mirror system.
In terms of Oztop’s taxonomy [11] then, the present
paper spans several categories. It is data driven in the sense
that the main aim is to reproduce a biologically observed
firing pattern (albeit at a necessary level of abstraction). It
falls into the ‘‘reason of existence’’ category in the sense
that it aims to elucidate possible fundamental causes of this
firing pattern. Although not using an evolutionary algo-
rithm, the model does thus also address whether or not the
mirror system would necessarily have evolved to represent
goals and could, to some extent, be included in the ‘‘evo-
lutionary algorithms’’ category. On the other hand, the
model does not assume a particular cognitive role for the
mirror system, thus not falling into the ‘‘assume existence’’
category.
Assumptions Made in the Present Model
A computational model necessarily comes with some
assumptions and simplifications. It is therefore important
to discuss these before describing the model in detail.
First, we choose to model the mirror system using a self-
organizing map paradigm [31]. The idea that mirror
neurons can be seen as a form of associative network is
not new; it is supported by, for instance, the hypothesized
organization of mirror neurons into functional groups or
pools, each encoding a specific type of motion [6, 8, 28].
In computational models, associative networks are a
popular approach for reproducing at a minimum a certain
functionality (e.g., multimodal integration) of mirror
neurons (see [11] for a section reviewing a number of
such models). In particular, it has been argued that the
‘‘reason of existence’’ of mirror neurons in such models is
phenomenological rather than functional [11]. Since a
point of the present paper is precisely to illustrate that
goal-specific activity [6] can emerge even without
assuming a functional role of mirror neurons (which does
not preclude a functional use of the resulting activity later
on), this is a good modeling approach for the present
purposes.
Cogn Comput (2011) 3:525–538 527
123
It should also be noted that some associative network
models of mirror neurons have in fact specifically used
self-organizing maps [2, 21] and illustrated that they can
be used for endowing robots with certain cognitive
functions (in this particular case, a form of language
comprehension). The approach in the present paper is
somewhat different since, rather than a hierarchy of maps,
we simply use one.
The second assumption, or more precisely set of
assumptions, concerns the model inputs. The mirror system
is known [25] to receive input from, among other brain
areas, the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the anterior
intraparietal area (AIP) and prefrontal cortex (PFC). The
former is thought to deliver information on observed
movements of others (whereas proprioceptive feedback
comes from the premotor areas, in particular the canonical
neurons), while the latter two transmit information about
the affordances of an object in view and the action goal if
the action is executed by the agent itself (see also [32] for a
more detailed modeling of affordances). These are of
course not the only inputs into the relevant parts of the
premotor areas, other information can come for instance
via area 7b [25] or the prefrontal cortex [28, 32]. For the
present purposes, however, we will limit ourselves to the
two inputs mentioned above: (1) an encoding of observed
or executed actions (obtained from the STS and canonical
neurons) and (2) an encoding of the affordances of an
object, which provide information on the context and likely
goal of the actions.
Our main concern is showing how modifying certain
aspects of the inputs affects a possible goal-specific activity
in the map. This is in a sense a theoretical argument and
requires the liberty to manipulate the inputs at will. It
would thus not be beneficial to implement the model in an
actual agent (robotic or simulated) in order to obtain the
inputs. At the same time, however, the inputs must retain
some relation to those that a sensorimotor system might
receive and generate. We thus limit our analysis to features
that are likely to hold true for any such implementation,
irrespective of the actual sensorimotor system and neural
circuitry. Aside from providing freely manipulable inputs,
this approach has the added advantage that it does not
accidentally tie the results to a specific implementation
only. Rather, the results will ideally be relevant for any
such system.
The main disadvantage of course is that the model does
not address in detail how inputs can be obtained. How-
ever, these are non-trivial but solvable problems that have
a strong research community behind them. In robotics, for
example, even the perception of human motion is a dif-
ficult challenge, often relying on motion capture systems
that may require the observed human to wear markers
[33, 34], although markerless approaches exist [35].
Generally, recognition and segmentation of motion have
been dealt with many times, both in the modeling of
mirror neurons and, generally, in the field of robotics [3,
24, 25, 33, 34, 36, 37]. The typical common ground (in
modeling terms) is that motion recognition is based on an
evolution of spatial coordinates over time. These can
simply be coordinates of the end-effector, whether
Cartesian [25] or joint angles [36]. Recently, it has been
shown that human action segmentation of object-centered
hand and arm movements is related to the kinematics of
the wrist, particularly its change in direction [38]. Other
approaches consider the body in its entirety [34], for
instance, demonstrated an online motion-segmentation
algorithm of whole-body motion based on hidden Markov
models.
Recognition of the context in which an action is
taking place is likewise a problem under heavy investi-
gation. Since mirror neurons only fire when an action
toward an certain object is executed or observed, this
recognition is likely to involve the processing of said
object’s affordances. Reviewing the literature on affor-
dances is beyond the scope of this paper, but a helpful
discussion can be found for instance in [39] and, more
recently, [32].
In humans and monkeys, several brain areas are
involved in the processing of affordances, including the
visual cortex (VC, for object edge detection), the AIP
(detection of object shape), the parietal reach region
(PRR, detection of object position) and, importantly, the
ventral occipitotemporal cortex (VOC, encoding the
object identity) [32]. In earlier work, the FARS model
[40] considers the AIP to determine different types of
grasps afforded by an object, of which area F5 (which
includes mirror neurons) then selects the most appropriate
one. Related work [24] extends this principle. From a
robotics point of view, for instance, [39] formulates a
psychologically motivated definition of affordances as,
broadly speaking, a relationship between an agent, an
object and the environment. The final encoding of context,
as relevant for the present work, can therefore be seen as
a set of affordances currently present in the environment.
Taking the setup by [6] as an example, this set could for
instance be ‘‘placeable’’ for a solid object and ‘‘eatable,
placeable’’ for food.
In sum, it is clear that the generation of the inputs may
involve non-trivial processing of sensory data which
depends on the agent under consideration, whether living
or artificial. However, our main concern in this paper is to
show how the processed data reaching the mirror neurons
may affect their organization. We therefore leave out a
detailed modeling of a neural pathway from sensory input
to mirror neurons and only make two assumptions: irre-
spective of the form (e.g., a vector of values, neural
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activation) or the detailed source (e.g., joint angles or
end-effector coordinates in the case of motion inputs),
both the motion and the context inputs can be represented
in a space that is (1) finite and (2) wherein different
motions (or contexts encodings involving objects with
different affordances) form distinct, mostly separable
subspaces.
Methods
Mirror Neurons as a SOM
The present work is based on modeling the mirror neuron
system as a self-organizing map (SOM, [31]). Using such
maps is appropriate here since the focus is on organiza-
tional principles of the modeled system. Although more
neurophysiologically plausible approaches exist [12], they
typically rely on hard-coding a large number of free
parameters in order to show the desired effect and thus lack
the autonomous self-organizing aspects that are important
when modeling developmental phenomena. In the present
case, it is preferable to have a modeling approach that can
address the developmental aspects even though it comes at
the expense of precise neurophysiological detail. The
qualitative nature of the results is, however, not affected by
such a lack of detail.
Generally, the viability of a SOM-based approach to
the modeling of mirror systems has also been shown
previously [21, 29]. The basic modeling approach pre-
sented here follows that of the latter paper. The total
input vector for the SOM is thus composed of two
parts—one part that encodes a motion primitive either
observed or executed by the agent in which the mirror
system is embedded and a second part encoding the
context in which this primitive is observed. As discussed
previously, it is simply assumed that vectors representing
motion primitives are sampled from clusters of data
points and that clusters for different primitives are dis-
tinct. There is thus some variability between different
vectors representing the same motion primitive. We fur-
ther postulate that data points representing motion prim-
itives executed by different types of limbs (e.g., arms and
legs) are also separated in the input space. Inputs defining
the context are likewise sampled from distinct clusters of
their own.
Thus, if m! m1; . . .; mnð Þ is a vector representing an
encoding of a motion primitive and c! c1; . . .; cmð Þ is sim-
ilarly a vector representing contextual encoding, then
the resulting input vector to the SOM is given by
i
!
m1; . . .; mn; c1; . . .; cmð Þ: We will show below that the
results presented here do not depend on specific lengths of
these vectors. In other words, the results are not affected by
the dimensionality of the input data.
SOM Initialization and Training
As in our previous paper [29], the SOM is initialized through
an infancy phase, roughly corresponding to a motor babbling
phase, in which it is merely exposed to points randomly
sampled from input spaces representing two limbs (e.g., arm
and leg), which ultimately results in two regions, each rep-
resenting one type of limb, within the map (see Fig. 1a).
During this phase, the neighborhood function nt and the
learning rate at decrease from their maximal values to low
(but nonzero) final values (here set to nmin = 1 and
amin = 0.2), according to the following equations:
nt ¼ nmin þ b s  nminð Þstc ð1Þ
at ¼ amin þ 1  aminð Þst ð2Þ
with s being the side length of the map, s0 = 1 and st ¼
max st1  1=tinf ; 0ð Þ; where tinf = 5,000 defines the dura-
tion of the infancy phase. The SOM thus remains capable
of online learning (e.g., it can learn to represent novel
motion primitives) but will not dramatically change in
organization (see [29] for details). Following the infancy
phase, the network is specifically exposed to data points
representing five different motion primitives shown in two
different contexts for a period equal in length to the infancy
phase. During this phase, the map develops regions that
specifically represent these primitives in the area corre-
sponding to the related limb (see Fig. 1 for an example).
The overall nature of this layout mimics the hypothesized
organization of the corresponding premotor areas [6, 28,
29]. Here, the main focus is on the detailed organization of
these regions under different conditions. For the remainder
of the paper, we therefore only consider motion primitives
from one of the possible limbs.
Neural Activity in SOMs Based on Input Distance
In traditional SOMs [31], the weight vector of every node
is compared to the input vector and a winning node, which
with the shortest distance to the input vector, is determined.
Here, however, we are more interested in the behavior of
all nodes than the mere location of the winning node.
Conceptually, one could thus see the nodes in the SOM as
neurons whose activity is inversely correlated with the
distance d to the input vector. For the purposes of this
paper, the values of d for all SOM nodes are therefore the
main parameter of interest (see Fig. 1 for an example).
Although it might be tempting to translate d into proper
neural activity for all subsequent analysis, doing so would
merely introduce freely tunable parameters (e.g., in the
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usually non-linear neural response function or connectivity
weights). Since these parameters could in principle be
tuned to highlight any behavior of interest, it is preferable
to avoid these extra (but unnecessary for the present pur-
poses) parameters and focus on the neural inputs in the
form of d here.
Parameters Affecting the Distance
The immediate question is which input features determine
the distance d between input and weight vector. To answer
this, we identify the maximal value this distance can have
under the constraint that both the input and the weight
vector encode a given motion primitive in a given context.
Remembering that the input vector i
!
i1; . . .; inþmð Þ is really
a composition of two vectors (of length n and m, repre-
senting motion primitive and context, respectively) and
calling the corresponding parts of the weight vector
x! x1; . . .; xnð Þ and y! y1; . . .; ymð Þ; d is given by:
d ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
X
n
j¼1
mj  xj
 2þ
X
m
j¼1
cj  yj
 2
v
u
u
t ð3Þ
where maximal values for d are simply determined by the
argument to the square root. Thus:
max2 dð Þ ¼ max
X
n
j¼1
mj  xj
 2þ
X
m
j¼1
cj  yj
 2
 !
ð4Þ
where it should be noted that there is a slight abuse of
notation in that the argument to the max ð Þ function
represents not a scalar function but a list of all possible
combinations of choices for m!; c!; x! and y!: Since all
terms are positive, this is equivalent to:
max2 dð Þ ¼ max
X
n
j¼1
mj  xj
 2
 !
þ max
X
m
j¼1
cj  yj
 2
 !
ð5Þ
Since both components of the input vector are sampled
from delimited clusters and assuming, since the present
model uses a SOM, that the weight vector of trained
neurons will also fall within these clusters, the highest
possible value for each term in Eq. 5 is simply the distance
between the two most distant points in the respective
cluster. It is always possible to surround the clusters by a
hypersphere whose diameter is given by those two points
(and whose center is given by their average coordinates).
Calling the radii of these hyperspheres rm and rc for the
motion primitive and context clusters, respectively, and
noting that rc ¼ rm=b for some b gives after simplification:
max dð Þ ¼ 2rm
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 þ 1
b2
s
ð6Þ
The maximal possible distance d between an input
vector encoding a given motion in a given context and a
weight vector encoding the same motion and context is
thus given by Eq. 6 (while the minimal distance is of
course 0), which illustrates that the only input space
parameters determining d are the radii of the clusters from
which the input components are sampled (and their relative
lengths) but not the dimensionality or the location of other
clusters, which is expected given the mechanics of a SOM.
Fig. 1 SOM visualization emphasizing distance between input vector
and nodes in a trained map. The figure shows distance (in color-
coding) from a target vector for every node. In this case, the target
vector has been sampled from a region of the total input space that
represents a motion primitive related to the first trained limb.
a Distances for all neurons, separation of the map into two body part
regions is clearly visible, with roughly half the nodes (in blue) much
closer to the input vector than the other half (red). b Same distances
but recolored after limiting the visible nodes to those encoding the
first limb (i.e., whose weight vectors fall into the first limb’s cluster
within the input space, corresponding to the blue region from a).
Several regions stand out, but only one is characterized by small
distances. c Visible nodes now further restricted to those whose
weight vectors indicate an encoding of the motion primitive presented
in the input vector (corresponding to the blue region in b). Again, a
separation into two classes is clearly visible, this time based on the
neuron’s goal preference
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Determining Neural Preference
Once the SOM is trained, 100 data points per motion
primitive are generated. This input is presented to the SOM
with the context components sampled from the first pos-
sible cluster, and the average distances of all neurons in the
SOM to all inputs are calculated. This is then repeated for
the same primitive but with context components now
chosen from the second possible cluster. The entire pro-
cedure is repeated for other motion primitives. Of funda-
mental interest are neurons that react to one motion
primitive either (1) independently of context or (2) only if
the primitive is shown in one of the two possible contexts.
The latter class of neurons corresponds to the context-
specific neurons observed by [6], while the first class is
context unaware.
The neurons in each class are thus determined as fol-
lows: For every neuron reacting to a motion primitive, if
its mean distance to input vectors given in the context of
one goal is lower than the mean minus one standard
deviation of the distance to input vectors from the second
context, then the neuron is said to be specifically encod-
ing the first goal. In all other cases, the neuron is said to
have no goal-specific preference. The advantage of this
approach is that it ensures a clear separation between
what is and what is not considered a goal-specific neuron.
The disadvantage is that the separation is somewhat
arbitrary. However, explorations with differently defined
separations have shown that the qualitative nature of the
results in the present paper are not affected by this,
although the precise numerical values will of course vary.
As with any computational model, stable qualitative
results are more informative than precise numerical out-
puts, and thus, we do not discuss the effect of varying the
definition of goal-specific vs. non-goal-specific in more
detail here.
Formally, the definition above can be expressed in a
cumbersome but general way as follows: For all contexts j
in which a given motion primitive is observed and any
neuron n, we can compute the mean distance lj,n between n
and input vectors sampled from some j as well as the
associated standard deviation rj,n. For a specific context k,
we can then define a set Mk;n containing all contexts j that
satisfy:
lj;n  rj;n\lk;n ð7Þ
The cardinality of Mk;n; written as Mk;n



; determines how
preferentially n encodes k. If C is the number of tested
contexts, the preference prefn,k of the neuron n for context k
is given by:
prefn;k ¼ 1 
Mk;n



 1
C  1 ð8Þ
In the case of two contexts (as used here), the preference
can only be 1 (high preference, Mk;n



 ¼ 1 and C = 2) or
0 (no preference at all, Mk;n



 ¼ 2 and C = 2). However,
if more contexts are used, this formulation implicitly
permits more graded evaluations. While there are, at
present, no neurophysiological data that define neural
preferences in more than two contexts, this definition of
preference may remain useful in future work.
Simulations
Initially, the two parameters affecting d, namely rm and b,
are varied across a range of values (discussed below) to
illustrate their effect on the goal-encoding within the SOM.
To obtain a representative dataset, the following is repeated
100 times for every choice of parameters: (1) An input space
(containing 5 subspaces encoding motion and two subspaces
encoding contextual information) is generated randomly; (2)
a map is initialized and trained on the five motion primitives
as discussed before; and (3) the map’s response to each
motion primitive in both possible contexts is measured by
presenting 100 randomly chosen input vectors per goal
context per primitive to the map and computing the distance
of every node to these vectors. Results are then calculated
from the entire dataset thus obtained.
Statistics
Most statistical tests reported have a standard 2-way layout.
However, unless indicated otherwise, a Jarque–Bera test
[41] rejected the null hypothesis that the data are normally
distributed, which prohibits the use of a 2-way ANOVA. In
these cases, we therefore use the nonparametric Friedman
test [42], which is an appropriate substitute if the data are
not normal.
Results
Model Parameter Effects
Given the mechanics of a SOM, one would not expect rm to
have a significant effect on the results, since the organization
of the map should merely depend on the relative distance
between the input vectors. On the other hand, b should affect
the organization of the SOM at least somehow since it reg-
ulates the relative size of the clusters from which the com-
ponents of the input vector are sampled. It will thus
determine how much of the total input variability can be
explained by variation in one component only. Whether or
not b will actually affect goal-specificity of neurons in the
SOM as defined in ‘‘Methods’’ is, however, less obvious.
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A quick exploration of SOM organization at a crude
granularity, varying rm from 10 to 150 in increments of 20
and b from 1 to 5 in increments of 1, confirms the above
expectations, showing that rm has no effect (df = 7,
v2 = 4.13, P [ .74) while, interestingly, b indeed affects
the goal-specificity of the neurons (df = 4, v2 = 3,711.57,
P = 0).
At this point, it is important to remember that b, as it is
used here, is the ratio between the radii of the clusters
representing one primitive and one goal. However, the
complete space from which the inputs for the SOM are
sampled contains several such clusters—five for the
primitives and two for the goals. One could therefore also
compute a ratio c between the radii of the clusters
encompassing all primitives and all goals. Due to the way
the input space is randomly generated here, there is no
strict 1:1 relationship between values for b and c in actual
data sets but the variability is small and the relationship
between the two is mostly linear. It is therefore possible
that the goal-specificity is really determined by c and that b
is merely a good indicator. Whether or not this is indeed
the case can be tested by increasing the minimum distance
between clusters representing individual primitives by
some factor f while not modifying the minimal distance
between clusters representing individual goals. This
increases c while keeping b constant. When varying b as
before and f from 1 to 20 in increments of 5 (4 in the first
step), we find that the f has no significant effect (df = 4,
v2 = 6.77, P [ 0.14) on the percentage of non-goal-spe-
cific neurons, even though it affects c as expected, while b
does (df = 4, v2 = 2,292.38, P = 0). This confirms b as
the parameter of interest here.
Overall, this is therefore an important result: It has been
shown that, in the context of this model, the main param-
eter with an effect on the behavior of interest is the relative
size of the clusters representing specific primitives and
goals. The detailed effects of b are investigated further in
the next subsection.
Goal-Specificity in the SOM and in Monkeys
The effect of b on goal-specific neurons Varying b, as
discovered, has a strong direct effect on the number of
goal-specific neurons. The larger the value of b, i.e., the
larger the diameter of the clusters encoding motion prim-
itives with respect to those encoding contextual informa-
tion, the smaller the percentage of goal-specific neurons.
(Fig. 2). To investigate this with a slightly finer granularity,
values were sampled at intervals between 0.1 and 1 in
increments of 0.3 as well as between 1 and 5 in increments
of 0.5, which, although chosen arbitrarily, can be seen to
cover the entire range from purely goal-specific neurons to
no goal-specific neurons in those responding to a motion
primitive in general (Fig. 2). Example SOM activations
illustrating the difference in goal-specificity of neurons
depending on b are shown in Fig. 3. It is also worth noting
that we found no significant differences between the
number of encoding the different primitives for b C 1
(lowest P [ 0.14 highest P [ 0.9) nor, as seen in Fig. 2,
any difference between neurons encoding different goals.
This is expected and merely serves as confirmation that the
results are not due to abnormalities in the model.
A comparison with neurophysiological data can provide
a rough estimate of possible b values in macaque
monkeys The neurophysiological results [6], which
showed that about a third of the measured neurons were not
goal-specific, are thus also reproduced by our model. To
determine the b value most likely to lead to a SOM
reproducing those results, we calculate the probability
density functions (PDFs) for the raw data underlying Fig. 2
for every value of b. This is done using a standard kernel
smoothing density estimate [43], with a window of 2%.
Figure 4 shows the value of every b’s PDF at the points
P = 24.4% and P = 35.8%, which are the percentages of
non-goal-specific neurons observed by [6] when the mon-
key was, respectively, observing or executing an action.
We find that the probability of obtaining P = 24.4% is
highest for b = 3, while that for obtaining P = 35.8% is
highest for b = 3.5. However, it has to be kept in mind that
b is technically a continuous parameter which we only
sampled at a few intervals and that, likewise, the PDFs are
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Fig. 2 Effect of b on the specificity of neurons. Black increasing line
indicates percentage of non-goal-specific neurons, solid (dashed) red
decreasing line is percentage of neurons preferring first (second) goal.
Dotted lines indicate ±1 SD. Solid (dashed) gray straight line
indicated the percentage of non-goal-specific neurons measured
during action execution (observation) by [6]. Varying b from 0.1 to
5 can be seen to cover almost the entire percentage range. There is no
significant difference between the percentage of neurons preferring
the first goal compared to those preferring the second goal (Color
figure online)
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continuous. This makes strong statements about ‘‘realistic’’
b values very difficult, and the present results should
therefore rather be seen as a good initial indication,
excluding merely the bs whose PDFs are near zero at the
points of interest.
Preferential encoding of some goals can be explained
through overrepresentation in training A second
interesting aspect of the neurophysiological results [6] was
a difference in percentage of neurons encoding each of the
goals. Specifically, more neurons encoded ‘‘eating’’ than
‘‘placing.’’ This is in all likelihood due to the fact that the
monkeys were exposed to the first goal more often in their
life than the second (placing is not an action that comes
naturally to monkeys). In a SOM, one would expect an
overrepresentation of inputs from a specific region of the
total input space to affect the resulting organization of the
map. Whether or not this would actually affect goal-spec-
ificity of the neurons as defined here is less obvious though.
To test this, we vary b again at a higher granularity from 1
to 5 in increments of 1.0, while the proportion P of motor
primitives shown in the context of the first goal (as opposed
to the second one) is given by:
P ¼ n
n þ 1 ð9Þ
where n is varied from 1 to 5, also in increments of 1. The
results show that P indeed affects the proportions of goal-
specific neurons and the percentage of neurons preferen-
tially encoding the first goal is correlated with the over-
representation during training of the SOM (Fig. 5).
Theoretical reasons for the b effect The main mech-
anism underlying SOMs is the organization of the neurons
so that similar inputs activate neighbouring neurons. Since
Fig. 3 Goal-dependent activity in neurons encoding one primitive for
different b. All plots show the distance between neurons encoding a
primitive and an input vector chosen from that primitive (as in
Fig. 1c). For the same value of b, the primitive component of the
input vector is kept identical and only the goal context component is
varied, to clearly isolate the effect of different goal contexts. A small
value for b (top row) results in markedly different activation patterns
for both goals, with neurons clearly separated into two groups, each
preferentially encoding one goal. A large value (bottom row) causes a
slight variation in activation but no clear goal preferences
Fig. 4 Best b values for reproducing observations in monkeys. Left
axis: percentage of non-goal-specific neurons as in 2, shown for easy
reference. Red (green) dashed line indicates corresponding percent-
age value of 35.8% (24.4%) found by [6] for monkeys executing
(observing) an action. Right axis: For every b, the value at points
P = 24.4% and P = 35.8% of PDFs generated on the dataset used to
obtain a mean value for the percentage of non-goal-specific neurons.
Observations in monkeys are most likely to be reproduced for
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Fig. 5 Overrepresenting the first goal during training. Stacked bars
show mean proportion of neurons representing the first and the second
goal, respectively, for different values of n (top axis, as defined in
Eq. 9) and b (bottom axis). Standard deviations are omitted for
clarity. It can be seen that varying n has no effect on the overall
proportion of goal-specific neurons but does affect their distribution
over both goals
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the input vector in this case is a concatenation of two
vectors, the relative importance of the individual compo-
nents for the organization of the SOM is a function of
how much of the maximal distance between two input
vectors (Eq. 6) can be explained by these components
individually.
Since the b values of interest are larger than 1, the
maximally possible distance between two input vectors
composed of vectors encoding the same motion primitive
but different contextual information is larger than the same
distance between input vectors composed of vectors
encoding the same contextual information but different
motion primitives. This leads to the organization of the
SOM into areas encoding a given motion primitive, as also
shown previously [29].
Within the area encoding a certain motion primitive,
whether or not goal-specific neurons emerge is then
dependent on how necessary the contextual information is
in representing the input data. In other words, the critical
question is how much of the maximal distance between two
input vectors can be explained solely by the maximal dis-
tance between the two motion-encoding components. In
general terms, we can answer this by considering the ratio
qm between the diameter of the cluster from which a given
motion primitive is sampled and the maximal distance
between input vectors:
qm ¼
2rm
max dð Þ ¼
1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 þ 1
b2
q ð10Þ
For the sake of completeness, we can also calculate qc,
which is the equivalent ratio for the contextual information
cluster:
qc ¼
2rc
max dð Þ ¼
2rm
b max dð Þ ¼
1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
b2 þ 1
p ð11Þ
From Eq. 11, we find qm [ 0.92 for a b value of 2.5 (for
which Fig. 2 begins to show a steady decrease in goal-
specific neurons). Thus, goal-specific neurons begin to
disappear when around 92% of the possible distance
between two input vectors can be explained from the
motion component alone.
As previously stated in the ‘‘Methods’’ section, the
assumption in this paper is not that the mirror system can be
equalled to a SOM, but merely that some of the principles
that govern plasticity in a SOM may also apply to the mirror
system. The effect of interest here is therefore the funda-
mental cause of the emergence of goal-specific neurons
within the SOM. We have shown that this cause is the fact
that the action encoding inputs can explain most of the
possible variability in the overall input (leading to primitive-
encoding areas) but not all of it (leading to goal-specific
neurons within these areas).
Model Predictions
b Regulates the proportion of goal-specific neurons but
not their organization An important question related to
overrepresenting one goal in the training data is whether
this affects the number of goal-specific neurons or merely
their organization. This is tested, as before, using the
nonparametric Friedman test on the newly generated data,
and it is found that P has no significant effect (df = 4,
v2 = 8.1, P [ 0.08, also seen in Fig. 5) on the percentage
of goal-specific neurons while b, of course, still does
(df = 4, v2 = 2,312.61, P = 0). This is a rather interesting
result since it indicates that, although b regulates the pro-
portion of goal-specific neurons, it does not by itself
determine how these neurons are then further organized. In
the present model, the proportion of neurons and their use
are therefore determined by separate parameters: The
proportion is defined by characteristics of the input (spe-
cifically the difference in maximal variability of both
components of the input vector), while the use of this
proportion is determined during training. This leads to the
prediction that, as the monkey learns a new goal to a level
sufficient to cause its representation in parietal mirror
neurons, some of the existing goal-specific neurons are
reassigned to encoding this new goal (as opposed to new
neurons being recruited to this effect). A possible way to
verify this would be through the recording of parietal
mirror neurons as a monkey learns a new goal (for instance,
placing rather than eating [6]) for an action.
Differences in firing patterns when monkeys were exe-
cuting actions (compared to observing them) may be
caused by different input encodings Slightly different
percentages of goal-specific neurons were reported,
depending on whether the monkey was executing or
observing the action [6]. It is hard to judge whether this
difference is a real difference in encoding or merely an
artifact due to the limited number of neurons that were
measured (see Fig. 4), and more experimental data would
be needed to resolve this. However, if it was confirmed that
the difference is real, the cause would need to be investi-
gated. The present model allows us to hypothesize that
there is in fact a difference in the variability in input
depending on whether an own movement or that by another
agent is observed. Rather interestingly, if the difference is
real, it would, in terms of the present model, indicate a
smaller value of b for inputs resulting from the observation
of the actions of others.
The model presented here predicts two possible causes
for such a difference in b: (1) There may be a higher
variability in the encoding of the proprioceptive informa-
tion about one’s own movement than in the encoding of
observed motions and/or (2) the variability in the context-
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encoding input might be smaller in the first case. Both of
these predictions should be testable through brain imaging
studies.
The first prediction implies that one’s neural encoding of
movements in STS during the observation of another’s
movement should show lower variability than the corre-
sponding encoding within canonical neurons when exe-
cuting the action oneself. Although not trivial to test, since
it requires the ability to measure such a variability from
neurophysiological recordings or perhaps imaging studies,
the prediction should in principle be verifiable.
The most likely cause for a smaller variability in con-
textual encoding when executing own actions, on the other
hand, is that the PFC may play a more prominent role in the
case of own actions, for instance by providing accurate and
certain knowledge of the goal of the action. One would
therefore expect less variability in the contextual input
(potentially accompanied by a weaker influence of the AIP)
when executing own actions. Additionally, said input
should remain similar for actions that have the same goal
but may involve different objects when executing own
actions (for example, coconuts and bananas are different
objects that are both likely to turn up in actions whose goal
is eating). On the other hand, observing actions would be
accompanied by inputs, likely involving the AIP to a
higher degree, which show higher variability during the
observation of one action and between actions, particularly
when the objects could also afford other actions with dif-
fering goals (for example, a coconut but not a banana could
be used as a weapon).
The value of b may vary between actions Finally, a
related observation (implicit in the model but not explored in
detail here) is that it may be possible that b values are dif-
ferent for different actions (e.g., reaching vs grasping) as a
consequence of the fact that b is defined based on the radius
of a cluster within the input space representing one motion
primitive. Clusters for different movements may have dif-
ferent sizes, which would affect b. This leads to the pre-
diction that, if such a difference in encoding really exists in,
for instance the STS (for observed actions), then neuro-
physiological recordings such as those presented by [6]
should find different proportions of goal-specific vs goal-
independent neurons for the same goal but different actions.
Discussion
A Developmental Model of Mirror Neuron
Organization
The present paper has presented a model of a developmental
process that can result in a SOM whose organization mimics
that found in mirror neuron systems [6, 28]. The model
builds on earlier approaches [4, 28, 29] that have addressed
different aspects of the mirror system. It goes beyond the
previous work by extending the modeled aspects to the
origin of goal-specific firing in mirror neurons [6]. At the
same time, it is a developmental model in the sense that the
organization of the SOM only emerges after repeated
exposure to the different inputs.
The model in the present paper thus presents the first
developmental account of how a simple SOM can organize
into a structure that reproduces features of (parietal) mirror
systems to a remarkable degree. It additionally provides a
grounded hypothesis of the reason that goal-specific neu-
rons may exist in the first place. Specifically, it has been
possible to show in this paper, through a systematic vari-
ation of model parameters, that the relation between geo-
metric features of sensory inputs encoding observed or
executed motion and inputs encoding an observed context
is a key factor affecting not only the existence of goal-
specific neurons but also their proportion.
In real-world terms, the values of b for which goal-
specific neurons were found (i.e., values above 1) imply
that a specific motion primitive can be encoded in more
diverse ways than a specific context. It is important to note
that this does not affect the number of ‘‘features’’ taken into
account as the b effect has been proven to be independent
of the dimensionality of the data. It merely implies, for
example, that the variability in the encoding of ‘‘grasps’’
(executed or observed) is larger than the variability in the
encoding of contexts that imply an overall ‘‘eating’’ goal.
A putative explanation for this difference in variability
can be obtained by considering the possible encodings
involved. Information about executed grasps is fed back
via proprioception, while observed action information is
relayed via the STS. Further, the action recognition
hypothesis implies that the action is only identified within
the mirror neurons. The information reaching these neurons
is thus not likely to be a consistent abstraction representing
the action, and one would therefore expect some variability
in the encodings of different instances of, for instance, a
grasp. This variability would be caused partly by the nature
of the grasp (observed or executed) and partly by the
details of the motion. Contextual information on the other
hand, provided mainly through the AIP, has likely been
heavily processed already [25, 32, 40], which may cause it
to be more consistent between instances of the same goal.
It also is interesting to note that the model has been able
to produce the goal-specific neurons without explicitly
implementing a hypothesized cognitive function of the
mirror neurons. That this was possible does not invalidate,
for instance, the action-understanding hypothesis (which
sees goal-specific neurons as important supporting evi-
dence) but it does provide a developmental account in
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which the emergence of such neurons is possible without a
specific cognitive requirement driving the evolution.
Rather, it appears plausible that goal-specific neurons are,
in fact, merely picking up on specific properties of the
encoding of information received by, for instance, the AIP
and PFC as well as STS and canonical neurons. Thus, the
cognitive ability to infer the goals of actions based on this
mirror neuron activity, should such a mechanism exists,
may have evolved on top of a mirror system organization
which already ‘‘accidentally’’ produced apparent goal-
specific firing patterns.
These findings further have implications in the design of
artificial systems endowed with mirror systems. It is likely,
as argued above, that the goal-specific mirror neurons play
a significant supporting role in aspects of higher-level
embodied cognition and social interactions. As such, it may
be desirable to include such a mechanism in artificial
systems, even though this has not been explicitly addressed
by previous models. The important consequence of the
work presented here is that this can be achieved simply
through an appropriate modeling of information delivered
to the mirror system rather than via an explicit mechanism
to represent goals.
Relevance to Embodied Cognition
In the present paper, we have illustrated a modeling
approach that, rather than tying the model to a specific
embodiment, systematically modifies relevant parameters
affecting the artificial sensory inputs received by the
model. While the current model is disembodied, except in
the minimal sense of being physically implemented on a
computer, it can nonetheless provide insights to situated
and embodied cognition by providing a model that is able
to mimic aspects of the neurophysiological properties
observed in mirror systems. In particular, it provides a
meaningful approach to studying processes of abstraction
from an embodied cognition perspective.
According to [44], most categorization is automatic and
unconscious, and it is part of what makes up our conscious
experience. Concepts, such as color concepts, are neural
structures that allow us to mentally characterize categories
and reason about them. Every conceptual structure is real-
ized as a neural structure. The very structure of human
reason, the way it is encoded in the underlying neural cir-
cuitry, comes from the properties of the embodiment and
situatedness of humans: ‘‘Our abilities to move in the ways
we do and to track the motion of other things give motion a
major role in our conceptual system. The fact that we have
muscles and use them to apply force in certain ways leads to
the structure of our system of causal concepts’’ [44, p. 19].
Barsalou [45, 46] argued that several misunderstand-
ings of embodied/grounded cognition have arisen because
of a lack of computational models for these kind of
cognitive processes, e.g., grounded theories being viewed
as ‘‘recording systems that only capture images (e.g.
cameras) and are unable to interpret these images con-
ceptually’’ [45, p. 620]. The type of model put forward in
this paper might provide a less problematic way of
explaining how the sensorimotor system (especially within
the premotor areas) organizes itself to represent more
abstract aspects of an action, e.g., the goal of the action.
Although the current model does not explain how a
system acquires conceptual content or tests the theories of
Barsalou [45, 46], it provides a mechanism for developing
a multimodal ‘‘representation’’ (e.g., goal-specific coding
of movements), beyond simple recordings, in a self-
organizing fashion in the course of agent–environment
interaction. Two aspects of the model are of particular
interest in the context of grounding embodied cognition.
Firstly, the resulting goal-specific ‘‘representations’’ are
the result of dynamic interactions between specific model
inputs. Although the main point here was to investigate
the b-effect rather than model the input provenance, these
inputs provide, via the STS and AIP [25], both sensory
and proprioceptive information. The ‘‘representation’’ of
actions and their contexts are thus a joint property of the
input characteristics, ultimately defined by sensory as well
as motor information, and the organization of the SOM.
Secondly, the model, although itself disembodied, sug-
gests that the development of goal-specificity is dependent
on the particular embodiment of the body part involved
(in the sense that the nature of the limbs may influence
the encoding of observed or executed actions involving
it).
Further, as discussed above, the model is able to predict
how simple features of affordance and observed/executed
motion processing may give rise to the observed neural
structure. In other words, rather than detailing which cog-
nitive features arise from a specific embodiment, the model
is able to suggest which embodiment is required for a
specific feature to arise. If one subscribes to the idea that
the organization of neural structures is an important aspect
of the cognitive and behavioral capacities they underlie
plus that the body and sensorimotor perceptions affect the
neural organization, then an account such as the one pre-
sented in this paper is highly desirable as it provides a clear
description of the required ‘‘format’’ of sensory inputs for a
desired neural structure. In robotics, such knowledge can
for instance be used in the design of a robot’s sensorimotor
mechanisms based on a specification of the desired cog-
nitive capabilities.
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Summary of Predictions
The model presented here has led to several predictions
that need to be investigated in further work. Here, we
summarize them briefly. We have shown that goal-specific
neurons can emerge in a SOM if the inputs have certain
properties (discussed in more detail above). The theoretical
reason for this, discussed in ‘‘Goal-Specificity in the SOM
and in Monkeys’’, was found to be that under these con-
ditions, the motion-encoding inputs alone were almost, but
not quite, sufficient for an adequate explanation of the
distances (and thus similarities) between different inputs.
Consequently, the predictions of the model center around
the relative properties of the inputs to the mirror system in
different conditions. These include the following: (1)
Learning a new goal reassigns existing goal-specific neu-
rons rather than recruiting new ones; (2) differences in
percentages of goal-specific neurons when responding to
executed and observed actions respectively can be due to
either lower variability in input from the STS compared to
that from canonical neurons and/or the involvement of the
PFC in defining contextual information to a higher degree
when executing own actions; and (3) pools of neurons
encoding different actions may show different b values.
Suggestions for testing these predictions were given in
‘‘Model Predictions’’.
In terms of mirror neuron research in general, the
importance of the model presented here is the emphasis
placed on the role that the model inputs have on the final
organization within the SOM. This has led to the pre-
viously discussed predictions of how mirror neurons may
be integrating the inputs they receive as well as how
motion- and context-encoding inputs may relate to each
other. Hypotheses regarding the roles that such mirror
neurons might play in, for instance, action understanding
[5, 6] need to take into account corresponding influences
of brain areas such as STS, AIP, PFC and canonical
neurons on the development of mirror neurons rather
than solely considering the ‘‘finished product.’’ For this
reason, developmental models in general are useful in
furthering our understanding of the emergence of the
mirror system. The present work adds to previous models
[4, 25, 30] by addressing the goal-specificity in parietal
mirror neurons.
Conclusion
We have presented a computational model detailing a
developmental process that results in pools of neurons in a
SOM encoding specific motion primitives as postulated by
the chain model [28]. We have shown that the neurons
within these pools can self-organize/develop into goal-
specific neurons as discovered by [6], and we were further
able to detail the precise mechanisms underlying the
emergence of such an organization and provide empirically
testable predictions of the model. This work thus provides
further support for the hypothesis that goal-specific mirror
neurons (in parietal areas) may not have specifically
evolved to support action understanding. Later cognitive
processes may well have evolved to make use of the firing
patterns which can facilitate action understanding, in what
could be an instance of neural reuse [47]. A similar argu-
ment has been presented previously for the development of
social roles of prefrontal mirror neurons [24]. Furthermore,
the work presented here extends previous modeling work on
premotor mirror neurons [30] and can be used in the design
of robotic systems dealing with the initial processing of
affordances and observed/executed motions in order to
facilitate a natural emergence (rather than a hard-coded
design) of a parietal mirror system complete with goal-
specificity within the agent’s controller.
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